Data from the two leading college admissions tests-the SAT and the ACT-can provide a valuable measures of student achievement, but bias due to the non-representativeness of testtakers is an important concern. We take advantage of a policy reform in Illinois that made the ACT a graduation requirement to identify the within-and across-school selectivity of ACTtakers. In contrast to cross-sectional or time-differenced estimates, estimates based on the Illinois policy change indicate substantial positive selection into test participation both across and within schools. Despite this, school-level averages of observed scores are extremely highly correlated with average latent scores, as noise introduced by across-school variation in sample selectivity is small relative to the underlying signal. As a result, in most contexts the use of observed school mean test scores in place of latent means understates the degree of betweenschool variation in average achievement but is otherwise unlikely to lead to misleading conclusions.
I. Introduction
Data from the two leading college admissions tests-the SAT and the ACT-can provide valuable measures of student achievement for researchers studying the economics of education.
In contrast to accountability tests administered by individual states or school districts, for which individual scores are rarely reported (and even less often have consequences for the individual test-taker), college entrance exam scores have important consequences for students, who therefore have incentives to perform as well as they can.
1 In addition, both the SAT and ACT have been administered in essentially the same forms for several decades, whereas states and districts typically substantially revise or discontinue their assessments every few years, making it difficult to assess trends over time. Finally, both the SAT and the ACT are administered nationwide to students from nearly every high school, and therefore permit comparisons both across and within states; alternative tests are often administered in only a single state or only to small samples of students.
However, an important concern about the use of ACT and SAT scores for research is the non-representativeness of test-takers. Both exams are taken primarily by college-bound students, who most likely perform better than would their non-college-bound peers. As a result, comparisons of mean SAT or ACT scores between schools or over time, for example, could be biased by the fact that only high achievers' scores are observed. Previous research has documented evidence of selection bias in state-level mean SAT scores and suggested selection-1 Many states have implemented high-stakes testing policies which reward or sanction schools or teachers based on their students' performance on the state achievement tests. These may be the worst of both worlds: Students do not clearly face incentives to do their best, while teachers may tailor their teaching to the test or simply cheat (Roderick et al., 2002; Jacob and Levitt, 2003) . See Koretz (2002) for an overview of the research on score inflation under testbased accountability policies. correction procedures for analysts working with state-level data (Dynarski, 1987; Dynarski and Gleason, 1993) . However, this work has focused on the SAT but not the ACT, which has become increasingly prevalent in recent years and which is now the predominant exam in many states. Furthermore, there is no available evidence on the degree of selection bias at the school or district level, and therefore little guidance for researchers conducting increasingly-common analyses with student-level test score data (see, for example, Krueger and Whitmore, 2001; Card and Payne, 2002; Rothstein, 2006; Abraham and Clark, 2006; and Hanushek and Taylor, 1990) .
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the degree of selection bias in mean SAT and ACT scores. We begin by reviewing the evidence on state-level selection into test participation. Dynarski (1987) documented a strong negative across-state correlation between SAT participation rates and mean scores. We show that much of this correlation is driven by the contrast between what we call "SAT states," where most college-bound seniors take the SAT rather than the ACT, and "ACT states," where traditionally only a highly selected group of students hoping to attend elite, private, out-of-state colleges took the SAT. Across SAT states, SAT scores and participation rates are essentially uncorrelated. A similar analysis of ACT scores and participation rates among ACT states is also consistent with no selectivity, though point estimates are larger. In contrast, we find stable negative correlations between scores and participation rates on secondary exams (i.e. SAT scores among ACT states and ACT scores among SAT states). The estimated selectivity thus varies in important ways across states: SATtakers are highly positively selected in ACT states but not in SAT states, while ACT takers are somewhat positively selected in SAT states but (perhaps) not in ACT states. Each of these results is robust to controlling for scores on the NAEP exam, given to a random sample of students in each state, as NAEP scores are approximately uncorrelated with test participation rates. 2 We then explore various strategies for estimating the degree of selectivity into SAT-and ACT-taking across and within schools. Our preferred strategy takes advantage of a policy reform in Illinois that substantially increased ACT participation rates but, plausibly, did not have important effects on underlying student achievement. Beginning with the high school class of 2002, the ACT exam was required for graduation. As a result, the Illinois ACT participation rate jumped from 71% in 2001 to 99% in 2002. Moreover, the impact of the new requirement varied substantially across schools, with larger increases in participation rates in schools that initially had low participation-so were far from compliance-and smaller increases in schools that already participated at high rates. Initial participation rates varied substantially with the school racial composition, with a strong positive association between the school white share and the participation rate in 2000. By 2004, the association between schools' white shares and their participation rates, while not entirely eliminated, was substantially attenuated. Racial composition is thus a strong predictor of the change in participation rates between 2000 and 2004 . Under the plausible assumption that the relationship between a school's racial composition and the latent achievement of its students did not change over this four-year period, the former is a valid instrument for the change in participation rates. Results from this analysis indicate strong positive correlations between test participation and latent scores, both within and across schools: Schools with the highest mean latent achievement have the highest participation rates, and within schools those students who would score highest are most likely to write the exam.
In our concluding section, we consider the implications of our estimates for analyses that do not have access to natural experimental variation in test participation and so do not adjust fully for selection. Across-school variation in latent test scores is large relative both to withinschool variation and to variation in test participation rates, so the bias in observed means is small relative to the underlying variation. Thus, despite the substantial selectivity into participation, observed mean scores are extremely highly correlated across schools with latent, unselected means. This result suggests that school-level analyses that fail to account for selectivity biases are unlikely to seriously misstate the relationships between admissions test scores and other variables, though these relationships will tend to be attenuated by as much as 25%.
In the next section we describe our data. We then provide an econometric model of selection into test taking and describe our estimation strategies. Section IV discusses the statelevel evidence, and Section V presents observational estimates of school-level selectivity.
Section VI presents our analysis of the Illinois reform. Section VII concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results for researchers hoping to use college admissions test scores as measures of school performance.
II. Data
For our school-level analysis, we construct school-level participation rates and mean scores from data sets containing samples of individual records on SAT and ACT-takers, matched to the high schools that they attended. Our SAT data set includes 100 percent of test-takers in California and Texas, 100 percent of black and Hispanic test-takers, and a 25 percent random sample of test-takers of other races. The ACT data set includes 100 percent of ACT-takers with missing race data, a 50 percent random sample of nonwhite students with nonmissing race data, and a 25 percent random sample of white students.
3 Our school-level analyses use data from the cohorts that graduated from high school in 1996, 2000, and 2004 ; for reasons that will become clear below, we use 1996 data for state-level analyses.
The SAT reports two subscores for each student, math and verbal, and a composite score.
Each of the subscores is reported on a scale with mean 500 and standard deviation around 100 among tested students (with a maximum score of 800 and a minimum of 200). The composite score is the sum of the math and verbal scores, and has mean 1000 and standard deviation around 200. The ACT reports several subscores, including one for a natural science subtest that has no SAT analogue. We focus on those that are analogous to the SAT math (the ACT math) and verbal (the sum of ACT English and reading) subscores, as well as the ACT "composite" score that averages over all subjects. We convert ACT scores from their native scale (ranging from 1 to 36 on each subtest) to the more familiar SAT scale.
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Both the SAT and ACT data sets contain high school identifiers that can be linked to records from the Common Core of Data (CCD), an annual census of public schools. 5 From the CCD, we extract the number of 12 th graders at the school, the racial composition, and the fraction of students receiving free school lunches (an indicator of poverty). Because sampling rates are so high in both the SAT and ACT data, the simple ratio of the number of (weighted) observations at the school to the number of 12 th graders provides an accurate estimate of the participation rate 3 In both data sets, minority students were over-sampled to permit more accurate estimation of race-specific models. The oversampling of missing-race students in the ACT data arose when ACT corrected a processing error in their original file. The oversampling of SAT-takers in California and Texas was to facilitate another project, for which those data were originally extracted (Card and Krueger, 2004) . Due to an error in the processing of the SAT data, we are missing observations in some years for SAT-takers outside of California and Texas who did not report a race. 4 The concordance comes from Dorans (1999) . 5 The Private School Universe Survey contains comparable information for private schools, but data are not available for all schools in all years. Our school-level analysis excludes private schools.
at all but the smallest schools. 6 All of our school-level analyses exclude schools with participation rates below 0.02.
The SAT and ACT are competing exams, and market shares vary substantially across states. In some states-the Northeast, some of the South, and the Pacific coast-most collegebound students take the SAT, while in others-the Midwest and Plains, and portions of the South-the ACT is more common. Colleges that enroll primarily nearby students (public universities, for example) tend to prefer the dominant test in their state, while national, elite universities tend to prefer the SAT but accept either. When a college will accept either test score, students can sometimes arbitrage between the two, taking both tests and reporting only the higher score.
7 As a result, students who take the less-popular test in their state-particularly SAT-takers in ACT states-tend to be those who hope to attend the most selective schools. Some students take college entrance exams before they enter 12 th grade, while others drop out before this point. Either of these can lead us to overstate participation rates. To avoid this, our denominator for the participation rate is the maximum of the number of 12 th graders and the average number of students per grade in grades 9 through 12. The latter average excludes grades with very low enrollment (i.e. a school that has grades 10 through 12 and a very few 9 th graders), defined as those with enrollment less than 10% of total enrollment in grades 9-12 at the school. There are still some schools where we count more test-takers (on one exam) than students per cohort. In these cases, we set the participation rate to 1 if the difference is less than 10% and drop the school otherwise.
7 This sort of gaming does not require students to take both exams, as re-taking is allowed on either exam and most colleges consider only the highest score (Vigdor and Clotfelter, 2003) . The tests' content differs somewhat, however, with perhaps more tests of knowledge on the ACT and of aptitude on the SAT, so a student may select into the test on which he believes he has a comparative advantage. level data, after converting individual ACT scores to the SAT scale as described above. states. However, within SAT states, the selection appears to go the opposite direction: schools with high participation rates tend to have higher scores than those with low participation rates, on both the SAT and the ACT. Similarly, within ACT states, schools with high participation rates tend to have higher scores than those with low participation rates on both exams.
III. A Model of Selection into Test Taking
We work with a standard Gronau (1974 ) / Heckman (1979 bivariate normal model of selection. As in Gronau (1974) , the group (school)-level selection probability is observed. 10 We allow for unrestricted school effects on latent test scores and explore different strategies for identifying the parameters of the selection process (and thereby the underlying school effects), relying on progressively weaker assumptions about the relationship between these effects and the participation rate.
We suppose that the latent test score of student i from school j in year t is t ijt * . The mean latent score in school j at time t is α jt , so
Only a fraction of students actually take the test. Student i writes the exam (and so we observe t ijt = t ijt * ) if μ ijt * >0, where
We assume that ε and u are bivariate normal with mean zero within each j-t cell. We define σ 2 = Var[ε ijt ] and ρ = corr(ε ijt , u ijt ), both constant across schools and years. We normalize Var[u ijt ] =
1.
We observe the participation rate in each school-year cell, p jt . Note the following relationship: A. Cross-sectional analyses
We hope to estimate the selection parameters, with the ultimate goal of identifying schools' latent mean scores, the α jt s. Depending on the data configuration, relatively weak or strong assumptions are required for this. We begin with the least-well-identified case, where only a single cross section of test scores is observed. A strong assumption, that there is no across-school average selectivity-that corr(α j , λ(p j )) = 0-is then required. If so, we can obtain an unbiased estimate of β = ρσ from a school-level regression of average scores on the inverse
Mill's ratio:
This regression is heteroskedastic, both because the number of observations used to compute t j varies across schools and because var(e ij ) varies with p j . A heteroskedasticty-robust estimator for is called for. Because p ) ( β V j is observed directly, we need not account for error in estimation of "first-stage" coefficients as in typical implementations of the Heckman model.
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To convert our estimate of β into one of ρ = β / σ, we need an estimate of σ 2 . Note that equation (5) implies that
We estimate the first term from the individual deviations from school mean scores:
where k is the number of schools in the sample and N the number of student-level test score observations. The second term is estimated from the across-school average, weighted by the number of test-takers:
This gives a straightforward estimate of the variance of residual latent scores:
. Inference on ρ might be by the delta method,
Of course, there is some sampling error in our estimation of the "true" participation rate at school j. In practice, this is negligible. When we take account of this sampling error (using the approach proposed by Murphy and Topel, 1985) , the estimated variance of the coefficients of (7) is essentially unchanged from those reported below (which neglect this component). though this would frequently indicate confidence intervals that extend above 1 or below -1. We report standard errors only for β; note that ρ equals zero if and only if β does.
B. First-differenced estimates
The assumption that there is no correlation between latent mean performance and test participation is implausible, as better schools almost certainly have both higher latent scores and higher rates of college-going. Indeed, the cross-sectional correlation between IMRs and mean scores is negative, which can only be true if ρ < 0 or if corr(α j , λ(p jt )) < 0.
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To weaken our assumption, we can take advantage of multiple observations on the selection-test score relationship at the same school, from different years. Suppose that we have observations from t=1 and t=0. Our identifying assumption is now:
That is, while there may be a cross-sectional correlation between a school's IMR and its latent average score, there is no correlation between the change in a school's IMR and the change in its latent mean score.
The difference between the expressions for school mean scores given by (6) in t=0 and t=1 is
Thus, with assumption (13) a regression of the change in school mean test scores on the change in IMRs estimates β. We can use the same approach discussed above to estimate σ and ρ.
14 With consistent estimates of β we can estimate α jt as t jt -β λ(p jt ).
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In the firstdifferenced data, we can use this to compute the point-in-time correlation between α jt and λ(p jt ).
As the identifying assumption of the cross-sectional strategy is that this correlation is zero, the first-differenced specification can serve as a test of the cross-sectional specification. We can also estimate corr(α jt , θ jt ), which measures across-school selection into participation in the same way that ρ measures within-school selection.
C. First-differenced estimates, with instruments
Even the assumption that the change in a school's IMR is uncorrelated with the change in its mean latent scores is unattractive, as the two may change together if a school's quality or demographic composition is evolving. With a suitable instrument for the change in the IMR, however, (14) can simply be estimated by instrumental variables.
Below, we form such an instrument by taking advantage of a policy change in Illinois in 1992 that mandated that all high school graduates take the ACT. Because demographic characteristics of schools were correlated with pre-implementation participation rates, the "bite" of these policies varied with school demographics. In particular, schools with higher minority shares had lower pre-implementation participation rates and larger increases in participation (and larger reductions in IMRs) surrounding implementation of the policy. Of course, minority share is correlated with mean latent test scores, but it is plausible that the base-year minority share is uncorrelated with the change in mean latent scores surrounding the implementation of the (continued) data yield very similar estimates of the parameters over time, so we report only estimates from models that constrain ρ and σ to be constant. 15 This is asymptotically unbiased, but not consistent unless the within-school sample size grows without limit.
policies. If so, this base-year minority share forms a valid instrument for the change in IMRs surrounding the policy implementation.
IV. State-Level Analysis
We begin by examining the relationship between test-taking rates and average admissions test scores at the state level. Figure 3A displays the scatterplot of state-level SAT participation rates and mean SAT scores for the 1996 graduating cohort, distinguishing between SAT and ACT states.
16 Consistent with previous analyses by Dynarksi (1987) and Dynarski and Gleason (1993) , the Figure shows a strong inverse relationship between average scores and participation rates. However, this inverse relationship is driven almost entirely by the ACT states and the contrast between ACT and SAT states; within the SAT states the participation-score correlation is much smaller. The graph is thus suggestive of strong positive selection into SAT-taking in the ACT states, as higher participation rates are associated with lower scores, and with weaker selection in SAT states. This is consistent with the idea that in ACT states only high-performing students who hope to attend elite out-of-state colleges take the SAT, while in SAT states all or most college-bound students take the exam. Figure 3B displays the same scatterplot for the ACT (concorded to the SAT scale). The overall negative correlation between test taking rates and average scores shown in the SAT data is not as apparent in the ACT data. However, consistent with the patterns seen in Figure 3A , there does appear to be an inverse relationship between average ACT scores and ACT participation rates in SAT states, although it is not nearly as pronounced as in ACT states in the SAT data. 16 As noted earlier, we focus in this section on admissions test data from 1996 in order to compare with 8 th grade NAEP scores for the same cohort in 1992. The relationships between test-taking rates and average scores are similar throughout the 1996 -2002 period.
Taken together, the two panels of Figure 3 suggest that selection into the secondary test in a state (the ACT in SAT states and the SAT in ACT states) creates bias in estimated mean scores, but that there is little bias in the dominant test. This is again consistent with the idea that students hoping to attend out-of-state schools are more positively selected than are students hoping to attend local colleges.
Of course, it is possible that latent ability is correlated with test taking rates, which would affect the observed correlations between test-taking rates and observed scores. For instance, if among the SAT states those with higher participation rates also tend to have higher mean ability, this could push the participation-observed score correlation upward, masking what perhaps would be a clear downward slope in Figure 3A . This can be seen as a form of omitted variables bias: The omission of a direct "ability" measure may bias the participation-observed score relationship to the extent that participation is correlated with ability.
To examine this, we turn to state-level NAEP scores, which are taken by random samples of students in each state and are therefore not subject to the selection bias that may be reflected in SAT and ACT averages. The lack of correlation between NAEP scores-interpretable as a measure of latent ability-and test taking rates in the ACT states suggests that the potential endogeneity of the participation rate does not seriously bias the correlations seen in Figure 3B for these states. In contrast, the positive correlation between NAEP scores and SAT participation rates in the SAT states suggests that the relationship between SAT participation rates and SAT mean scores in Figure 3A may be biased downward by the omitted "ability" variable. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 attempt to absorb the potential correlation between statelevel participation rates and mean achievement by controlling for four-year-lagged NAEP scores.
These controls have little effect on the estimates. Reflecting the strong correlation between lagged NAEP scores and SAT participation rates in the SAT states, the inverse Mills ratio coefficient for SAT participation in SAT states rises by 80 points, though it remains small and insignificantly different from zero. In the ACT states, estimates of selection bias remain large and significant for the SAT data and become significant for the ACT data (reflecting a substantial increase in precision-NAEP scores absorb a great deal of the variation in ACT scores-as well as a small increase in the coefficient).
V. School-Level Analysis -Observational
The above analyses-identification issues aside-are suggestive of the bias that selective participation induces in estimated state-level mean test scores. Selection at the state level combines two distinct margins: Student sorting across schools that vary in their participation rates, and within-school selection. 18 The latter is the most relevant for analyses of school-level test scores. As noted earlier, a school-level analysis has the potential to break apart the two components. In this section, we present observational analyses of the relationship between school-level test taking rates and average scores at the school level, first using cross-sections of schools and then examining changes over time. Each approach requires implausible assumptions to identify the selectivity parameters, and each in turn yields implausible estimates of the key within-school selectivity parameter, corr(ε, u). In the next section, we exploit the Illinois policy reform to identify within-school selectivity under more plausible assumptions.
A. Cross-sectional estimates 18 If the mean latent achievement is independent of the participation rate at the state level, the IMR coefficient from a state-level regression equals (σ α 2 + σ ε 2 ) 1/2 ρ, where ρ is a combination of within-school and across-school, within-state selectivity:
(σ ε σ u corr(ε, u) + σ α σ θ corr(α, θ)). If there is no within-school variation in achievement or the propensity to participate (σ ε = σ u = 0) this reduces to the between-school selectivity, corr(α, θ); if there is no between-school variation (σ α = σ θ = 0) it reduces to the within-school selectivity, corr(ε, u). 19 The four panels show data for the SAT and ACT exams in SAT If school participation rates are independent of mean latent scores, the negative relationship between inverse Mills ratios and average scores indicates negative selection into test participation within schools-that is, that the weakest students in each school are the most likely to take the college entrance exams. Table 3 reports the correlation between test-writing propensity and latent scores within schools implied by each regression. This is much more negative for the dominant exam in a state than for the secondary, but estimates of selection into the SAT in SAT states and for selection into the ACT in ACT states are quite similar.
The final row in each panel of Table 3 shows the implied across-school correlation between latent mean scores, α, and the propensity to write the exam, θ = Φ -1 (p). The identifying assumption in Table 3 is that λ(p) is uncorrelated with α across schools (that is, that school participation rates are independent of mean latent scores). Once this assumption is imposed, corr(α, θ) can only be non-zero due to nonlinearities in the mapping between λ(p) and θ. As this mapping is approximately linear (with substantial nonlinearities only as p approaches 0), it is not surprising that the estimated across-school correlations are all approximately zero.
Of course, the identifying assumption for Table 3 , that the test-taking rate at a school tells us nothing about the quality of its students, is quite implausible. Schools differ in their quality, and quality is almost certainly correlated with rates of college attendance (and therefore with admissions test-taking rates). A positive relationship between latent scores and participation rates across schools would bias downward the relationship between observed scores and inverse Mills ratios, likely accounting for the large negative cross-sectional estimates observed here.
B. Time-differenced estimates
One might hope to remove the correlation between test participation rates and school quality by focusing only on changes over time in school-level participation rates and scores.
This strategy removes any fixed components of school quality, and identifies the selectivity parameters if changes in test participation are unrelated to changes in a school's latent score. Figure 6 shows scatterplots of the changes in schools' participation rates and mean observed scores between 1994 and 2000. There is substantial variation in the changes in both participation rates and mean scores, but in each panel the two are uncorrelated. Table 4 Even these differenced results, we believe, cannot be taken very seriously. The larger estimated ρ's (as compared with those in Table 3 ) suggest that differencing reduces the endogeneity of participation rates, but we have no assurance that it is eliminated. If school quality (or the composition of school enrollment) evolves at all between 1994 and 2000, one would expect that this would produce a positive correlation between the change in θ and the 20 Because corr(α jt , λ(p jt )) is constrained to be the same in the two years, any time variation in corr(α jt , θ jt ) must arise from nonlinearity in the relationship between λ(p jt ) and θ jt = Φ -1 (p jt ).
change in α, and that estimates in Table 4 will continue to be biased downward. To eliminate this bias, we need a source of variation in the change in participation rates that is exogenous to changes in school quality.
VI. Illinois Policy Reform
We turn now to our analysis of data from Illinois, an ACT state, during the years The new requirement led to large increases in test participation in Illinois. It would be rash, however, to assume that this means that changes in inverse Mills ratios in Illinois schools surrounding the policy implementation are entirely exogenous to changes in school quality.
First, initial test-taking rates varied substantially across schools. As the new requirement had more "bite" in schools with lower initial participation rates, one might expect that schools with lower quality would have tended to see larger participation increases as they complied with the policy. Second, compliance with the policy was incomplete, with the average participation rate 21 The other initial component of the PSAE was two sections of ACT's "Work Keys" exam. Students are not required to "pass" the PSAE, and the introduction of the test is not related to any other statewide changes in school policies. 22 The exceptions are that the NCAA does not currently consider these scores for academic eligibility determinations for college athletes, though it is reconsidering this position, and US Military Academies do not accept the exam. Colorado introduced a similar program around the same time, but we focus on Illinois because the sample size is so much larger there. Michigan will implement a similar requirement in 2007. rising only to 89% as calculated in our data in 2004 (as compared with 57% in 2000). 23 If schools that complied fully differed in their quality from those that did not, this would again be a source of potential endogeneity of the change in test participation rates.
Fortunately for our analysis, however, it is relatively easy to identify clear patterns in the impact of the policy that are plausibly unrelated to changes in school quality. Figure 7 shows the scatterplot of school-level participation rates against school the fraction white at the school for We exploit this feature of the data to generate variation in the "bite" of the Prairie State requirement that is plausibly exogenous to changes in school's latent test scores. Specifically, 23 The difference between the 89 percent test taking rate calculated with the microdata and the 99 percent rate reported by the ACT corporation likely has to do with the denominator. In our work, we calculate the denominator from the Common Core of Data as the greater of the number of 12 th graders and the average number of students per grade. If dropout rates are high, the average number of students per grade may over-state the number of potential test takers and lower the test taking rate. 24 Chicago also implemented a variety of reforms in the years studied that might affect scores, test participation, or the distribution of students across schools, as described in Jacob, 2005 . All of our analyses of Illinois data allow for unrestricted differences between Chicago schools and the rest of the state in test score and participation changes between 2000 and 2004. 25 The basic shape of the data is invariant to the use of the school's 2000 racial composition on the horizontal axis in both years. indicate that a 1% rise in either the black or the Hispanic share at a school was associated with a 0.2% decline in the test participation rate over this period. Not surprisingly, all of these results are reflected in mirror image in the models for IMRs in the second panel. 26 Data from the NAEP indicate that the black-white mathematics test score gap among Illinois 8 th graders grew by 2 points (on a scale with standard deviation 36) between 1990 and 2005, while the Hispanic-white gap fell by 8 points over the same period. This trend, if it holds equally across-and within-schools but there are no spillover effects on white students in highminority-share schools, will tend to lead us to overstate the within-school selection into participation slightly. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that this might account for as much as one fifth of the ρ estimates that we report below.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat this analysis for Illinois high schools, including a dummy for
Chicago schools in each specification. These estimates are strikingly different from those for states not exposed to the policy: The intercepts indicate that participation rates at all-white schools rose by about 26 percentage points. The growth in participation was more than twice as large in all-Hispanic schools-though only five Illinois high schools had Hispanic shares above 85%-and about 60% larger in all-black schools. The coefficients on the change in racial composition between 2000 and 2004 are positive but extremely imprecisely estimated. Table 6 presents analyses of the relationships between ACT participation rates and scores in Illinois. The first column reports a cross-sectional model using 2000 data. This is quite similar to the analogous model in Table 3 , and like that indicates strong negative selection into test participation. The second column shows a first-differenced specification using changes between 1994 and 2000, as in Table 4 . Like the earlier first-differenced models, this indicates zero within-school selectivity and strong positive between-school selectivity.
The remaining columns of Table 6 , consistent with the idea that the policy served to reduce the "signal" variation in test participation that might correlate with the quality of the school or its students.
VII. Implications for Analyses of Unadjusted Means
The final component of our analysis is to draw out the implications of our results for analyses that, because they lack a source of exogenous variation in participation like that produced by the Illinois policy change, are unable to correct for the causal effect of test participation on observed scores. We cannot estimate the precise sample selectivity bias without producing the exact specification that a researcher might attempt to estimate, but we can report some relevant correlations.
The key parameter for school-level analyses is the correlation between the observed mean score at a school and the underlying latent mean, α. To the extent that this correlation is large, schools with high observed scores will tend also to have high latent scores, and analyses that treat the observed mean score as a measure of the school's quality will not be unduly affected by selection bias. (That is, coefficient signs will likely be correct; as we demonstrate below, the scale of estimated effects will be smaller, as observed means are less variable than are latent means.)
To see this, consider a regression that would be correctly specified if the dependent variable was true mean latent scores α, but suppose that the observed mean score t is used instead. Let R be the coefficient from a projection of jt t onto α jt. Then if the true model is:
(15) α jt = X jt *β + ε jt , we can write (neglecting intercepts)
The bias in an estimated regression coefficient (relative to βR) depends on the coefficient of a projection of ( jt t -α jt R) onto X. This will vary with the choice of variables to include in X, of course, but it will necessarily be small if
that is, if corr( jt t , α jt ) is large. Table 7 presents various relevant parameters that are implied by the IV estimates in Table   6 . The first row repeats the within-school correlation, ρ. The next several rows show estimates of the across-school standard deviations of average observed scores, mean latent scores, the school-level participation parameter θ, and the selection term in models for observed average scores, ρ*σ*λ(p). All are computed from the same Illinois data used in Table 6. In both 2000 and 2004, the across-school standard deviation of mean observed scores is about 112 SAT points. This is notably smaller than the standard deviation of latent scores, which is around 140 in 2000 and 125 in 2004; comparing this to the within-school standard deviation (σ) of around 185 indicates that about 35% of the variance of latent test scores is between schools. By comparison, the standard deviation of θ is around 0.6. As the within-school variation in test participation is normalized to have variance one, this indicates that only about one quarter of the variation in test-taking propensity is between schools.
The next rows of Table 7 show the correlation between observed and latent scores, first unconditional and then conditional on the school racial composition. These are extremely high, all well above 0.9 and generally above 0.95. Thus, the omitted selectivity correction in models that use unadjusted observed mean test scores is quite small, with a standard deviation around 20
points. R -the coefficient of a projection of observed means on latent means -ranges from around 0.7 to around 0.9. Coefficients in regressions like (16) will be attenuated relative to the true β by 10-30%, but any additional bias is likely to be quite small.
To illustrate this further, Figure 8 shows the scatterplot of school mean observed scores against estimated latent means (estimating α jt as jt t -ρ σ λ(p jt )) in the left-hand panel, and the scatterplot of the residuals of these variables from regressions on school fraction white in the right-hand panel. Both show extremely high correlations, suggesting that qualitative results from regressions that use school mean test scores as the dependent variable are likely to be invariant to corrections for selection bias. On the other hand, Figure 8 also reinforces the result that latent scores are notably more variable than are observed means, so the magnitude of estimated coefficients will not be invariant to this substitution. Indeed, while the regression of school mean observed scores on the fraction white-the source of the horizontal axis in the right-hand panel of Figure 8 -has a coefficient of 258, when estimated latent scores are used instead the coefficient is 304.
The final row of Table 7 displays the overall selectivity of test participation, combining the across-and within-school components. The estimates range from 0.5 to 0.75, suggesting that test-takers are strongly positively selected on the whole. This is the relevant parameter for correcting state mean scores, supposing that the relative importance of within-and betweenschool components of selectivity do not vary across states.
Of course, all of these estimates are derived from models estimated from data on Illinois ACT-takers in the early 2000s. They are dependent on the validity of the exclusion restrictions underlying our IV estimates, and even if these are valid, they may not generalize to other states or to SAT scores.
On the other hand, several patterns in the data suggests that the basic conclusion-that selection bias is unlikely to be an important determinant of the qualitative results of analyses that take school-or state-mean test scores as the dependent variable-is likely to be quite robust.
Because test-taking rates are less variable than observed scores, and because the two are so highly correlated, observed test scores are unlikely to be seriously misleading about rankings of states or schools even if selection into test participation is much more extreme than our estimates indicate. As a final exercise, we computed latent scores under the assumption that the selection coefficient, ρ, equals one. The correlation between observed and latent school means in Illinois is 0.99 when we use our estimated ρ and falls only to 0.93 when we impose ρ = 1. Table 8 presents several alternative calculations of this correlation, which is extremely robust. Columns 1 and 3 focus on mean test scores, while Columns 2 and 4 convert both observed and latent scores into ranks within the state of Illinois, a common way of comparing schools. We also explore specifications that narrow the comparision group. While the first row of the Table uses all Illinois schools to compute the bivariate correlation, the second row presents the correlation controlling for school racial composition, and rows 3 and 4 limit the sample to the relatively homogenous subset of schools that serve the Chicago suburbs. All correlations are extremely high: When we use our estimated ρ, they range from 0.94 to 0.99; even when we assume that ρ = 1 the range is 0.8 -0.94. With such high correlations, there is little room for substantive bias even when test scores are not corrected for selection into test participation.
VIII. Conclusion
Researchers often use scores on college admissions tests as measures of student achievement. But since only a select group of students take these tests, analyses that use selected scores as a proxy for the true latent test score may be biased. Correcting the selection bias has been difficult: important unobserved variables likely impact both the propensity to take the test and the latent test score, and as a result standard selection corrections without an instrument perform poorly.
In this paper, we use a policy change in Illinois requiring all high school juniors to take the ACT as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in changes in school-level participation rates over time. Using this instrument, we find that test takers are strongly positively selected both across and within schools: Participation rates are higher at higher-performing schools, and within schools higher-achieving students are more likely to take the test. The across-school variation in latest test scores is large relative both to within-school variation in latent scores and to across-school variation in participation rates. As a result, observed mean scores are highly correlated with latent means, and selectivity bias serves to attenuate variations in school mean scores but is unlikely to introduce further bias. Thus, despite the strong selectivity of test participation, simple analyses using observed school-level test scores without controls for selectivity are unlikely to produce misleading results. 195.0 195.3 194.3 193.4 193.4 196.3 Note: Average ACT scores are computed from ACT micro-data, concorded to the SAT scale using the concordance developed by Dorans et al. 1999 .
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Notes: Estimates in columns 1 and 2 derive from the specifications reported in columns 4 and 6 of Table 6 , respectively. 
